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THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
AND ITS EXCEPTIONS:
AN INTRODUCTION
A. B. Conant, Jr.**
The act of state doctrine' poses a serious obstacle for plaintiffs
seeking redress in United States courts for wrongful public acts by
a recognized foreign sovereign within its own territory. Depending
on the circumstances, however, various exceptions to the Doctrine
may be invoked. This article is intended to be a brief introduction
to the Doctrine and its exceptions and a survey of recent cases in
which the Doctrine was construed by United States courts. The
present inquiry into the nature and scope of the doctrine begins
with the seminal case, Underhill v. Hernandez,2 where it was held
that:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be
obtained through means3 open to be availed of by sovereign powers
as between themselves.

Almost all of the early case law around which the doctrine developed involved situations in which plaintiff was asserting the
* The author has kindly submitted this paper as a background summary of the
legal theory underlying the legislation proposed by Representative Albert Gore,
infra.
** B.A., 1961, North Texas State College; J.D. cum laude, 1963, Baylor University.
1. The doctrine of sovereign immunity will often hinder judicial redress also.
Although the Act of State Doctrine and the doctrine of sovereign immunity are
interrelated, the latter doctrine is outside the scope of this article. In addition,
no attempt will be made in this article to analyze the possible effects of proposed
antitrust legislation on the Act of State Doctrine. It should be noted, however,
that such proposed legislation may significantly affect prior decisions in this area.
See Hunt v. Mobile Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.,), cert denied, 432 U.S. 904
(1977); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597
(9th Cir., 1976); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F.
Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 950 (1972).
2. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
3. Id. at 252.
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wrongful taking of property by revolutionary governments or military officials in the midst of political turmoil. The net effect of
these decisions was to establish a rule that expropriation, nationalization, or confiscation of property by a foreign government (either
before or after the taking) would be recognized by United States
courts.4
The modern restatement of this rule and the current foundation
for development of most act of state doctrine case law is found in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.5 In Sabbatino the Supreme
Court stated that:
[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of
property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government,
extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the
absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking
violates customary international law.'
The range of foreign governmental activity which is exempt
from judicial examination under the act of state doctrine remains
ambiguous. It is perhaps broader than the "taking of property"
upon which the Court's decision in Sabbatino was grounded. However, it is questionable whether it reaches as far as the New York
Court of Appeals interpretation in French v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba.' In a footnote in French, the New York Court stated that:
"It is immaterial what form an act of state takes-whether it be
an expropriation or confiscation, a conversion or breach of contract
. . .as long as such act is committed by the foreign government
4. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468 (1937); Ricaud v.
American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S.
297 (1918); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
Underhill is an interesting exception. Plaintiff, Underhill, was an American citizen caught up in a revolution against the Venezuela government after having
constructed a waterworks system for the city of Ciudad Bolivar. He was captured
by revoluntionary forces and forced to operate the waterworks for a two month
period before being allowed to leave the country. Underhill's suit against his
captors for false imprisonment and other alleged injuries resulted in a directed
verdict against him on Act of State grounds since the United States had subsequently recognized the revoluntionary government.
5. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
6. Id. at 428.
7. French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 53; 242 N.E.2d 704 (1968)
295 N.Y.S.2d 433.
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within its own territory." 8 (cites omitted).
In fact, all acts by a foreign government are probably not exempt. In Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,9 Mr.
Justice White, speaking for four members of the Court, wrote:
[W]e are nevertheless persuaded by the arguments of petitioner
and by those of the United States that the concept of an act of the
state should not be extended to include the repudiation of a purely
commercial obligation owed by a foreign sovereign or by one of its
commercial instrumentalities. Our cases have not yet gone so far.'0
Although this holding was asserted not to state a new legal principle," Mr. Justice Stevens, while concurring in the balance of Justice White's opinion, declined to join in that holding.' 2 Justices
Marshall, Brennan, Steward and Blackmun dissented.' 3 Assuming
that the act of state doctrine does not include the commercial acts
of a foreign state, "the line between commercial and political acts
of a foreign state often will be difficult to delineate"" and the
question of which acts are protected from judicial scrutiny by the
15
doctrine remains unsettled.
The act of state doctrine does not prevent judicial scrutiny of
actions taken by a foreign state outside its territorial jurisdiction
or which purport to have extra-territorial effect.' 6 This limitation
8. Id. at 754, 242 N.E. 2d at 709, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 441.
9. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
10. Id. at 695.
11. As Justice White pointed out, "Distinguishing between public and governmental acts of sovereign states on the one hand and their private and commercial
acts on the other hand is not a novel approach." Id.
12. Id. at 715 (Stevens, J. concurring).
13. Id. at 715 (Marshall, J. dissenting). This division led a Texas court to
question "the validity or existence" of the commercial act limitation on the Doctrine. Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Company, 570 S.W.2d 503, 508 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ granted).
14. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 715
(Powell, J. concurring).
15. See Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965); National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Industrial Investment Development Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., [19781] Trade Cas. 62,130 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
16. Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 221 U.S. 580 (1911); Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972); Tabacalera
Sereriano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Company, 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968); Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l. City Bank, 353 F.2d
47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966); Zwack v. Kraus Bros. & Co.,
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gives rise to difficult questions concerning the situs of a sovereign's

actions and their effects. However, there is one limited area in
which the situs question has been definitively resolved. The courts
will not consider issues which have been created by a boundary
dispute between nations on the ground that a "political question"
is presented."
A final question concerning the coverage of the doctrine is posed
by the language of Sabbatino limiting its effect to cases not controlled by a "treaty of other unambiguous agreement regarding
controlling legal principles." 18 The term "treaty" is clearly defined

in United States law, however, the meaning of "other unambiguous agreements regarding controlling legal principles" is not.
Professor F. A. Mann remarked in Studies in InternationalLaw
with regard to the Sabbatino decision:
In the present context, the operative words are: "in the absence of
a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal
principles." Where there is agreement of this kind, there exists a
rule of international law . .

.

.Nor is it likely that "unambiguous

agreement" should be read as being ejusdem generis with "treaty."
If this were so, the phrase would have been otiose, since it would add
nothing to the term "treaty."' 9
The potential problems posed by the "unambiguous agreement"
language in Sabbatino are legion. For example, does the doctrine
apply where there is a contract (or concession) between a foreign
sovereign and a private party and the sovereign subsequently
breaches the agreement (a situation which did not exist in
Sabbatino)?The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas had an opportunity to consider this question in Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Company."0 The Hunt court was faced with the problem of
whether an oil concession, issued and subsequently expropriated
by the Libyan government was an "unambiguous agreement" such
as to remove it from the Doctrine. Unfortunately, the court's opinion fails to clarify the matter. After quoting the Doctrine as set
forth in Sabbatino, the court said: "We have examined subsequent
1978).
237 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1956); Kalmich v. Bruno, 450 F. Supp. 227 (N.D. Ill.
17. Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn v. A Certain Cargo, 577 F.2d 1196 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. pending.
18. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
19. F. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 469-70 (1973).
20. Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Company, 570 S.W.2d 503 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ granted).
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cases which cite the aforementioned language and conclude it is
unclear what type of unambiguous agreement the opinion refers to.
However, we conclude that this language is inapplicable to this
case since, as we have held, Libya did not expropriate property
(the oil) from Hunt."'" Based in part on this statement, the court
ultimately concluded that the act of state doctrine barred consideration of Hunt's claim. This reasoning is particularly unfortunate
because if there was no taking, there is a serious question as to
whether the act of state doctrine as enunciated in Sabbatino is
applicable at all, and, if there was a taking, the question of
whether the concession was an "unambiguous agreement" should
determine the applicability of the Doctrine.
Assuming that an offending governmental action does fall within
the general scope of the act of state doctrine, a case may fall within
existing exceptions. Congress has created one such exception, and
22
the courts, perhaps, two others.

21. Id. at 510.
22. Divisions of opinion in the United States Supreme Court, caused in large
measure by different views as to the theoretical underpinnings of the Doctrine,
have clouded the validity of these exceptions. A multitude of scholarly articles
have been written discussing and disputing the theoretical basis and legal genesis
of the act of state doctrine and it is beyond the scope of this article to survey them.
Some indications of the dispute, however, are obvious in the following quotations.
Opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by seven members of the Court, in
Sabbatino:
The text of the Constitution does not require the act of state doctrine; it
does not irrevocably remove from the judiciary the capacity to review the
validity of foreign acts of state.
The act of state doctrine does, however, have "constitutional" underpinnings. It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of powers. It concerns the competency of
dissimilar institutions to make and implement particular kinds of decisions
in the area of international relations. The doctrine as formulated in past
decisions expresses the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may
hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and
for the community of nations as a whole in the international sphere.
376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
Opinion of Mr. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Mr.
Justice White in the Citibank case:
The act of state doctrine . . . has its roots, not in the Constitution, but
in the notion of comity between independent sovereigns . . ..

The line of cases from this Court establishing the act of state doctrine
justifies its existence primarily on the basis that juridical review of acts of
state of a foreign power could embarrass the conduct of foreign relations by
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The so-called "Bernstein exception" had its genesis in a series
of related cases in the Second Circuit. Following World War II,
Bernstein instituted suit against a Dutch company, alleging that,
under duress imposed by Nazi officials, he had been required to
transfer all of his shares in a ship line to a German who ultimately
transferred those shares to the Defendant. 3 The court held that it
was barred by the act of state doctrine from considering plaintiffs
claims insofar as they involved duress applied by the Nazi government. The court indicated, however, that its decision might be
different if the executive policy regarding the doctrine was clearer.
After further proceedings in the lower court, the case again
reached the Second Circuit.2 4 Again, the court returned the case to
the lower court and ordered the plaintiff to refrain from alleging
matters which would cause the court to pass upon the validity of
acts of German officials.
The court subsequently amended its mandate when the State
Department expressed a definite policy relieving United States
courts from any inhibitions against passing upon German acts.25
The State Department announced its policy in a letter from Jack
B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State, to the attorneys for the plaintiff. The letter declared:
The policy of the Executive, with respect to claims asserted in the
United States for the restitution of identifiable property (or cornthe political branches of the government.
First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765 (1972).
Mr. Justice Douglas declared in Citibank: "Sabbatino held that the issue of
who was the rightful claimant was a 'political question,' as its resolution would
result in ideological and political clashes between nations which must be resolved
by the other branches of government." 406 U.S. 759, 772 (1972) (Douglas, J.
concurring in result).
Opinion of the 5th Circuit in Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc.:
This is not an abstention doctrine, but rather resembles a conflicts of laws
principle ....

Although in one decision the Court stated both that the

doctrine had constitutional underpinnings and the doctrine was not compelled by the Constitution, the better view would be that the doctrine is
constitutionally compelled by the concept of separation of powers and
placement of plenary foreign relations powers in the executive.
577 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 n.4 (5th Cir. 1978) (citations omitted).
23. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
24. Bernstein
Maatschappij, 173
25. Bernstein
Maatschappij, 210

v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche
F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949).
v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche
F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).

StoomvartStoomvart-
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pensation in lieu thereof) lost through force, coercion, or duress as
a result of Nazi persecution in Germany, is to relieve American
courts from any restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to
pass upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials. 6
In response to the State Department's position, the Second Circuit declared: "in view of this supervening expression of Executive
Policy, we amend our mandate in this case by striking out all
restraints based on the inability of the court to pass on acts of
officials in Germany during the period in question. ' 27 Subsequently, in Sabbatino, the Department of State made no statement concerning its position on Cuban expropriations. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that it was not required to pass
2
upon the Bernstein exception. 1
The question of the validity of the Bernstein exception came
squarely before the Supreme Court in First National City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba.-*The decision was inconclusive with the
Court splitting four ways in its treatment of the exception. Justices
Rehnquist, Burger, and White held:
We conclude that where the Executive Branch, charged as it is with
primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, expressly
represents to the Court that the application of the act of state doctrine would not advance the interests of American foreign policy,
that doctrine should not be applied by the courts. In so doing, we
of course adopt and approve the so-called Bernstein exception to the
30
act of state doctrine.
Justice Douglas concurred in the result, relying upon a different
theory to hold for First National City Bank.3 1 Mr. Justice Powell
also concurred, making up the majority, but he did not specifically
uphold or deny the Bernstein exception. Although he expressed
some doubts regarding the Bernstein exception, he considered
Sabbatino was wrongly decided, and concluded "that federal
courts have an obligation to hear cases such as this. ' 32 Four judges
33
dissented, expressing disapproval of the Bernstein exception.
26. Id. at 376 (quoting letter from Jack B. Tate to Attorneys for plaintiff in
C.A. No. 31-555 (S.D.N.Y.) (April 13, 1959)).
27. Id.
28. 376 U.S. at 420.
29. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
30. Id. at 768.
31. Id. at 772 (Douglas, J. concurring in result).
32. Id. at 775-76 (Powell, J. concurring).
33. Id. at 776 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
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The second judicial exception was the basis of Justice Douglas'
concurring opinion in FirstNational City Bank v. Banco Nacional
de Cuba. This exception might be characterized as the
"counterclaim" or "fair dealing" exception. Relying upon National
City Bank v. Republic of China," Justice Douglas stated that,
when a claim was initially asserted in United States courts by the
foreign sovereign, the party injured by the sovereign's act should
be entitled to assert a counterclaim, notwithstanding the act of
state doctrine, and to set off so much of his counterclaim as equals
the sovereign's claim. Justice Douglas declared:
I would allow the setoff to the extent of the claim asserted by Cuba
because Cuba is the one who asks our judicial aid in collecting its
debt from petitioner and, as the Republic of China case says, "fair
dealing" requires recognition of any counterclaim or setoff that
eliminates or reduces that claim."
Justice Douglas' reasoning was rejected by five justices, thus the
viability of the "fair dealing" exception is doubtful.
The legislative exception to the act of state doctrine was passed
by Congress as an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1964,38 and reflected congressional discontent with the Court's decision in Sabbatino.Known as the Hickenlooper Amendment, this
amendment provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United
States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine
to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the principles
of international law in a case in which a claim of title or other right
to property is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or a
party claiming through such state) based upon (or traced through)
a confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that
state in violation of the principles of international law, including the
principles of compensation and the other standards set out in this
subsection: Provided, That this subparagraph shall not be applicable (1) in any case in which an act of a foreign state is not contrary
to international law or with respect to a claim of title or other right
to property acquired pursuant to an irrevocable letter of credit of not
more than 180 days duration issued in good faith prior to the time
of the confiscation or other taking, or (2) in any case with respect
34.
35.

348 U.S. 356 (1955).
406 U.S. at 772.

36. Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301(d), 78 Stat. 1013
(1964) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976)).
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to which the President determines that application of the act of
state doctrine is required in that particular case by the foreign policy
interests of the United States and a suggestion to this effect is filed
on his behalf in that case with the court."
Despite this broad language, the only reported case in which the
Hickenlooper Amendment has been successfully invoked was
Sabbatino on remand." Although the statute was remedial in nature, the courts have tended to construe it very narrowly," and
beginning with French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,4" they have
grafted a number of limitations upon the Amendment. French
involved a Cuban currency restriction which was designed to stop
the flow of foreign currency from that country. The plaintiff held
certain "certificates of tax exemption" issued before the passage
of the currency restriction. They purported to give the holder the
right to exchange Cuban pesos for United States dollars upon surrender. The New York court held that the Hickenlooper Amendment was inapplicable since there was no taking or confiscation.
It declared:
The Government of Cuba, by its Decision No. 346, has actually
done nothing more than enact an exchange control regulation similar to regulations enacted or promulgated by many other countries,
including our own .... A currency regulation which alters
[n]either the value or character of the money to be paid
in satisfac''4
tion of contracts is not a "confiscation" or "taking. 1
Although this holding disposed of the case, the court, responding
to a strong dissent argument that the amendment applied, went
on to state that the Amendment was inapplicable to claims for
breach of contract. It should be noted, however, that the court was
careful to limit its decision to the sort of contract with which it was
confronted. Referring to plaintiff's assignor, the court said:
37. Id.
38. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 272 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd.,
383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
39. See First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759
(1972); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 33 F. Supp. 92 (C.D.
Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiain, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950
(1972); French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704, 295
N.Y.S. 2d 433; United Mexican States v. Ashley, 556 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1977).
40. French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704, 295
N.Y.S.2d 433 (1968).
41. Id. at 55, 242 N.E.2d at 710, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
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He did not, it must be emphasized, have any fund of dollars with
which this action is concerned nor did he have rights to any specific
fund of dollars in the possession of any party ....
In the strictest sense, and within the terms of the statute we are
construing, just as no one has "taken" the pesos from Ritter, so no
one has "taken" the contract from him. . . . No other party claims
to be possessed of the contract rights that Ritter had acquired. It is
not as though the Cuban Government had assumed title to a contract right or other chose in action that belonged to Ritter and had
then sought to enforce it against the obligor."
Finally, the French court held that in any event the currency regulation in question did not violate international law."
Whether contractual rights were intended to be included within
the scope of "property" as used in the Hickenlooper Amendment
was discussed in dicta in Menendez v. Saks and Company." In
that decision, the Second Circuit declared: "[W]e are persuaded
by the legislative history, and particularly by Congress' insertion
in 1965 of the words 'to property' immediately after the phrase
'claim of title or other right,' that the intent was to exclude all
contract claims from the amendment."4 5 The Supreme Court, however, in reversing the Second Circuit, did not reach the lower
court's ruling regarding the Amendment. Indeed, it expressly
noted: "The Court of Appeals rejected the importers' contention
that the Hickenlooper Amendment . . . precluded intervenors
from invoking the act of state doctrine. The correctness of that
judgment is not before us in this litigation.""
The distinction between "contract" and "property" was also
discussed by way of dicta in Occidentalof Umm al Qaywayn, Inc.
v. Cities Service Oil Co." In 1969, Occidental obtained a concession from the ruler of Umm al Qaywayn, a sheikdom on the Persian
Gulf, and Buttes Oil & Gas obtained a concession from the adjacent sheikdom of Sharjah. Because of a boundary dispute between
Sharjah and Umm, these concessions overlapped in part. Iran sub42. Id. at 59, 242 N.E.2d at 713, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 445-46.
43. Id. at 63-64, 242 N.E.2d at 715-16, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 449-50.
44. Mendez v. Saks and Company, 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S.
682 (1975).
45. Id. at 1372.
46. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 689 n.4
(1975).
47. 396 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. La. 1975), rev'd sub nom., Occidental of Umm al
Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo, 577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978).
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sequently claimed the same area. Following the settlement of the
dispute between Sharjah and Iran, Buttes commenced drilling
operations in the disputed area. Before any oil had been extracted
from the disputed area, however, Umm cancelled Occidental's
concession rights, allegedly because Occidental had failed to pay
monies required under the agreement." When oil sold by Buttes
arrived in the United States, Occidental instituted suit. The district court held that the actions of Sharjah and Iran did not
amount to a "confiscation" within the language of the Hickenlooper Amendment. The court said that "[tierritorial waters
claims are subject to a body of international law, wholly different
from that related to confiscations."49 Although this holding disposed of the case, the district court went on to declare that Occidental's concession rights were merely contractual in nature and
were not covered by the Hickenlooper Amendment. The court was
careful to point out, however, that the concession had not been
developed by Occidental and that no oil had been produced therefrom. The court said:
Applying these principles to the instant case, what was allegedly
confiscated? It was not the oil which was extracted from the disputed area by Buttes in 1974. It was not an oil well or an oil mine.
The well from which the oil was extracted was owned by Buttes and
developed and drilled by them, pursuant to their concession agreement with Sharjah. The property allegedly confiscated was the Oc5
cidental concession. It was not the confiscation of an oil well. '
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit dismissed in part and reversed in
part. " The appellate court did not discuss the "contract" point.
Rather, it held that it had no jurisdiction over the action because
the question presented was a "political question" and, therefore,
not a "case or controversy" as defined by Article III of the Constitution.5 2
The question of taking of a fully developed oil concession
reached the courts in Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing
Company. 3 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals citing Occidental
48. Id. at 465.

49. Id. at 471.
50. Id. at 472.
51. Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo, 577 F.2d 1196,
1206 (5th Cir. 1978).
52. Id. at 1201-05.
53. 570 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ
granted).
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and French, held that the act of state doctrine barred its consideration of Hunt's claim because Hunt had only a contractual right in
the concession. Based on its reading of Libyan law, the court refused to classify Hunt's rights as being "property" notwithstanding the concession's grant of rights to extract, use, export, and
dispose of the oil.
A second judicial limitation was engrafted on the Hickenlooper
Amendment by the Second Circuit in the Citibank case discussed
above." In that case, the United States bank foreclosed on certain
assets of the Cuban Government held by the bank as collateral for
a loan following seizure of bank property in Cuba. The bank applied the proceeds to the amount owed on the loan and retained
the excess as an offset to losses suffered when Cuba expropriated
its facilities. Cuba subsequently sued to recover the excess, and
Citibank counterclaimed. The Second Circuit held that the Hickenlooper Amendment was not applicable to Citibank's counterclaim, because neither the property expropriated by the Cubans
nor proceeds derived therefrom had been brought by the Cubans
into the United States. The court concluded from the Amendment's legislative history that the term "property" had reference
only to property, or the proceeds or products of such property
brought into the United States. The Supreme Court reversed on
different grounds. 5 Subsequent decisions in Citibank did not discuss the Hickenlooper Amendment or the requirement that expropriated property be brought into the United States, except in a
brief footnote. 6 Nevertheless, 5the
Second Circuit's limitation has
7
been adopted by other courts.

There remain many unanswered questions concerning the doctrine. What is the theoretical or jurisprudential basis for the
doctrine? Is it based on comity between nations? Does it arise from
the relationship between branches of the United States
Government? Is it a conflict of laws principle? Does the doctrine
cover all actions taken by a foreign country or are a nation's commercial activities excluded? Can the expropriating nation protect
itself simply by calling its action a nationalization rather than a
breach? Does a private party protect himself against wrongful gov54. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank of New York, 442
F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971).
55. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 400 U.S. 1019 (1971).
56. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 780 n.5,
(1971) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
57. United Mexican States v. Ashley, 556 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1977).
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emnment action by a contract or concession with the government,
or does such a contract or concession actually prevent him from
asserting his rights in a United States court? Is the function of the
Hickenlooper Amendment merely to prevent the sale in America
of wrongfully taken goods or is it to protect American rights wherever the wrongdoer may choose to dispose of the expropriated
property?
The law in this area remains in a state of flux. Recent judicial
decisions have provided little clarification, and past legislative attempts to alter the conclusive nature of the act of state doctrine
have not yet proven successful in the courts. There are cases presently pending which may provide some answers. 8 Additionally,
proposed legislation, if passed, may profoundly affect this area of
the law.
58. Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo, 577 F.2d 1196
(5th Cir. 1978); Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Company, 570 S.W.2d 503
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ granted).

